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The advancement of positioning technologies in defense intelligence 
Abstract 
The adoption of positioning technologies to supplement, complement and function as defense 
intelligence applications has become widely accepted within homeland security and military circles. At 
the core of advancement are four main positioning technologies. Specifically these are the global 
positioning system (GPS), second generation (2G) and beyond mobile telephone networks (including 
wireless data networks), radio-frequency identification (RFID) and geographic information systems (GIS). 
For all positioning technologies, both separately and when combined, it is of primary importance to their 
continued adoption that the controlling powers have an in-depth understanding of the causality between 
implementation, usage and flow-on effect. This relies on an alignment of defense strategy, knowledge 
systems, security requirements and citizen rights within the broader social context. Whereas this social 
context must respond to continuing security breaches, advancements in technology, and the ever-
changing face of bureaucracy there is however, great difficulty in creating an uncompromising foundation 
for homeland security which is at all times both void of complexity and suitable to all. Even more difficult 
though is to predict both the events and consequences which will herald from the systems now being 
created. 
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The Advancement of Positioning Technologies in Defense Intelligence 
Katina Michael, Amelia Masters 
INTRODUCTION 
Through a path of development and commercialization, systems integration and 
convergence, the use of positioning technologies in defense has become an accepted, if 
not standard, feature of intelligence applications. Explored in Realized Applications of 
Positioning Technologies in Defense Intelligence (the precursor to this chapter), four 
main positioning technologies are identified as being at the core of advancement. These 
are the global positioning system (GPS), second generation (2G) and beyond mobile 
telephone networks (including wireless data networks), radio-frequency identification 
(RFID) and geographic information systems (GIS). Alone, each technology presents a 
unique aid during responsive and preventative defense scenarios– ranging from warfare 
through to the dissemination of information- but when used together their force and reach 
are multiplied. 
 
The control and command of this power is paramount as we note that, continuing into the 
21
st
 century, our global society is faced with an uncertain and wholly dynamic security 
environment. In addition to known geographic and cross-border aggressions, the hidden 
threats of terrorism and the complexities of information warfare also seem to be 
increasing. The result is that world governments now more than ever need to actively 
understand and monitor the environments in which they and their citizens participate. 
Where positioning technologies play a significant role in this environment, a context of 
use needs to be created whereby defense strategies are appropriate and security 
requirements are accordingly aligned.  
 
Written to supplement the previous investigation of realized applications, this chapter is 
an exploration of the future evolutionary path of positioning technologies in defense 
intelligence. It seeks to provide insight into how positioning technologies could be used 
to prevent and respond to a breach in security, and will analyze these types of 
implementations from within a social context. Current awareness of positioning 
technology applications will then be used as the foundation for a predictive analysis of 
future trends, culminating in a final assessment of advancement. 
 
PREDICTED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS 
While entirely hypothetical, a predictive investigation of positioning technology usage 
points to possible defense intelligence approaches using current technology. The 
applications are not spelled out as ‘this’ or ‘that’ application but rather follow a 
conjoining theme throughout. The predictive scenarios attempt to cover pre and post a 
breach in homeland security, from preventing a threat, to managing, responding and 
recovering from an attack. Thus they consider what is traditionally known as 
‘contingency planning’ through to ‘emergency management and response’. 
 
Preventative Scenario 
The preventative approach proactively seeks ways to stop a potential terrorist attack or 
breach in security by using all the relevant information available to form intelligence 
about an event that has yet to occur. It is like bringing pieces of a jigsaw puzzle together 
to form a picture; only here almost certainly a large number of pieces are missing and the 
final picture to be represented is ambiguous. Intelligence is not merely about certainties, 
as indeed questions will always be raised over even the clearest of intercepted data that 
shows how an adversary will strike. Increasingly, intelligence is about pulling a diverse 
range of data sets together in their native form, including video, audio, text, spatial and 
graphical, to create a big picture view of proceedings. It is not a ‘crystal-ball’ approach or 
the work of a good ‘forecaster’- it is more about being alert to day-to-day happenings. 
Popp et al. (2004, p. 36) use the analogy of joining the dots, only it is much more 
complex than that, given there is no specifically defined problem and very little is known 
about where to begin searching for the answer. Initially it may be a worthwhile exercise 
to study previous terrorist attacks and to consider these in light of the possibilities. This 
does not mean that all terrorist attacks and security breaches are executed in the same 
manner but it recognizes a benchmark for future attacks. It showcases what is possible, 
and gives warning that future attacks will grow in sophistication, process and magnitude. 
 
Defense intelligence data that is gathered from different sources needs to be collected and 
analyzed holistically within a spatial Information Management System (IMS). This can 
be done using geographic classification as the primary key for creating relational links 
between database tables. Specific end-user applications can then be built which use a 
secure Web-based portal to run queries and generate relevant reports. High-level 
information can be nationwide, with the ability to zoom-in into state, postal code, street 
and individual dwelling levels with a mixture of satellite, aerial and vector-based data 
sets. Even though new dwellings are erected every day, land, sea and similar boundaries 
are for the greater part static. What constitutes Australia and Australian waters for 
instance will not change overnight. Independent of the data type, geospatial systems can 
cope with a diverse range of information and act as the hub for comparison and decision-
making. The reality is though that no single agency owns all the geographic content. 
There could be hundreds of suppliers in any given nation. An initiative like the National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in the U.S. as a “national intelligence and combat 
support agency whose mission is to provide timely, relevant and accurate geospatial 
intelligence” is strongly recommended for any country concerned with national security. 
Independent of a united body however, there may still be problems with determining 
which spatial data set(s) to use. There can be conflicts between data sets that were created 
in different years and by different organizations. For example, town centers may shift, as 
may the size of postal codes within them due to processes such as gentrification. Annual 
spatial links between data sets thus need to be made to ensure that vintage data is not 
rendered completely useless to the situation at hand today. Making a decision on the 
government agencies that will be responsible for updating and maintaining each data set 
is also very important. Most likely, suppliers like the Lands Department in the local area 
will have accumulated thousands of different data sets since the inception of digitization. 
Being able to identify which maps are meaningful is a long and time-consuming exercise 
but it must be done by a specific taskforce who have the end result in mind. The aim is to 
build a standardized clearinghouse where defense intelligence personnel with access 
privileges can acquire this data. The facility may even allow for dynamic updates. A note 
here is required to state the obvious- that above and beyond the need for standardization 
of GIS, it is critical that the adversary does not gain access to defensive GIS data. There 
have already been several cases argued in the United States that show enemies of the 
nation to be acquiring and using map data from public web sites for intelligence 
purposes. Terrorists too can utilize hi-tech to their advantage. 
 
While defense intelligence is usually considered a multifaceted multipart problem due to 
the great number of unknowns, there are some general rules that apply. Foremost, defense 
intelligence is more about making use of valid information- one can act on ‘fact’ but can 
only consider acting on “incomplete, ambiguous and/or unreliable” intelligence (Yen, 
2004, p. 34). And in terms of sureties, the only thing any nation can claim to know, at 
least to begin with, is its own geographic landscape. Knowing oneself is the beginning of 
wisdom. The question is how to know another? How can a nation predict terrorist attacks 
when terrorists continually conceive new ways to inflict terror? As Popp et al. (2004, p. 
37) state, “…we are faced with a new world in which change occurs very rapidly, and the 
enemy is asymmetric and poses a very different challenge; the most significant threat 
today is foreign terrorists and terrorist networks whose identities and whereabouts we do 
not always know.” Historically, though we can point to contemporary terrorist examples 
as far back as the 1960s, it has been recently that an escalation in activity has taken place. 
In Egypt a series of car bomb blasts targeted numerous luxurious hotels along the Sinai 
Peninsula (2004, October 8); in Indonesia a car bomb exploded in front of the gates of the 
Australian Embassy in Jakarta (2004, September 9); in Beslan in Russia, hundreds of 
schoolchildren and their parents were taken hostage and the crisis ended in bloodshed 
(2004, September 1); in Madrid ten explosives were detonated remotely by mobile phone 
hitting four trains at three stations (2004, March 11); a truck bomb exploded outside the 
UN headquarters in Baghdad (2003, August 19); a powerful car bomb was detonated 
outside the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta (2003, August 5); in Russia civilians were taken 
hostage at a Moscow theatre venue (2002, October 25); in Bali it was several explosives 
in vehicles that were detonated remotely using a mobile phone aimed at a popular night 
venue (2002, October 12); the hijacking of planes in the U.S. and their use in bringing 
down the Twin Towers (2002, September 11); the utilization of the U.S. postal service to 
deliver mail containing Anthrax spores (2001, October); the destruction of the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; the release of toxic fumes of sarin gas in a 
Tokyo subway station (1995, March 19); the countless suicide bombers in Israel that have 
attacked public venues and buses (2001, August 19 till today); the list goes on. Trying to 
find a common link between all of these breaches in security is difficult, even though 
traditionally terrorists use one of six tactics: bombing, hijacking, arson, assault, 
kidnapping, or taking hostages (Wang, 2004, p. 23). Independent of the type of attack 
though, if one reduces the events down to the lowest common denominator there are 
some commonalities. Foremost, that it is people that conceived and executed these 
attacks. The other two unknowns that need to be found to curb any attack are the 
proposed timing of the event and the proposed location of the event. Although an 
individual’s mind cannot be read, there are technologies that can track where individuals 
are, when they are there, and with whom these individuals are communicating (either for 
personal or business transactions).  
 
Notwithstanding the serious privacy implications, knowing an individual’s community of 
interest (CoI) could probably reduce the number of terrorist attacks and breaches in 
security. CoI brings together important pieces of information: the location of a 
caller/messenger (origination location and time), the actual traffic flow (how long a 
caller/messenger was involved in the transaction session and the type of transaction), and 
the destination location of the receiver whether it be local, long-distance or international. 
CoI is a term that can be found in teletraffic theory but its applicability here for 
preventative security purposes is equally relevant. Such telecommunications concepts as 
point-to-point communication matrices, network neighborhood analysis, homing patterns 
and topology layout, traffic analysis aggregation, payload demands, gravity models, 
internodal distances, shortest-path routes, points of interconnect, interconnect traffic, 
centralized or distributed traffic architectures, and logical and physical network views are 
useful in analyzing any type of people communications. Yen (2004, p. 34) describes the 
task of trying to detect suspicious activities of terrorist groups as social network analysis. 
For instance, an individual wishing to cause a major disaster in a location could not act 
alone. They will use some form(s) of communication- telephone, mail, email or fax. 
Being able to trace such information could help authorities identify possible suspects. 
Consider being able to trace every location visited by an individual, including homes, 
businesses, and public space. This information could be used to build not only a geo-
profile of the individual but also some sort of psychological assessment. Already caller 
details records (CDR) are used to help police and federal authorities to catch criminals. 
Beyond CDRs, the mobile phone itself could be used to present typical routes taken by 
the individual. Things being sent by individuals, like mail or parcels, could also be tagged 
using RFID. Sender information is still optional in many countries but knowing where the 
package came from is important. Given the ability to back-track on historical exchanges 
between suspected terrorists, it could help to decrease situations like the U.S. Anthrax 
scares. 
 
There are different ways that CoI could work, and this in itself is a project for further 
research. CoI could be implemented by using an anticipatory approach or, as has been 
presented in this hypothetical scenario, it may be implemented in real-time. Among the 
prospective social models to implement such a system are (in order of invasiveness): 
i) one global ‘follow-me’ number is allocated to individuals at birth; 
ii) all citizens are required to carry/wear a permanent mobile tracking device; and 
iii) all citizens are implanted with a RFID transponder. 
It is also possible to understand the social models as complementary to one another, 
evolving over time. Determining an accurate CoI matrix, requires the identification of at 
least two or more fixed geographic locations, as either originating or terminating nodes. 
CoI in the scenario given here would work with ‘mobile’ nodes, that is, tracking actual 
human beings as they go about their daily tasks. Knowing where a person has been does 
not necessarily make them a suspect, but given a series of circumstances they could be 
considered for deeper surveillance. There are already well-instituted person-number 
systems in the majority of nations, although these techniques are not entirely useful given 
the majority were created at a point when computing power was relatively primitive. In 
many instances, duplicate citizen numbers are creating grave problems for government 
data-matching programs. An alternate proposal is a universal ID (UID) at birth. This ID 
could be used for a plethora of applications, from an individual’s telephone number or 
email address, to their fixed home address, dispelling the problem of inter-country 
movements and intra-country location. The main argument for a UID is that it will 
eliminate the problem of false identities. The UID would have a wide-ranging use. 
Yasuura (2003) has put forward the idea of a Personal Identifier (PID) system for 
bidirectional authentication and an RFID tag system for a “new social infrastructure”. 
The “digitally named world” would require members of society to be identified by a 
PID/UID and for all goods and products to be identified by RFID. It would even be 
possible to know when an individual has entered a particular building or when they have 
purchased particular materials. The view of pervasive computing thus becomes “a world 
of omnipresent but invisible information technology embedded into products and 
everyday items” (Siegemund & Flörkemeier, 2003, p. 378). From here it is a small 
advance for users to interact with objects using mobile phones. The querying could 
happen via SMS and active tags could thereafter process the commands sent to the object. 
Apart from the RFID UID, a GPS wrist-worn device would also identify an individual’s 
exact whereabouts. As Werb (p. 52) speculated in 1999, “[i]n the not-to-distant future… 
GPS devices will become so small and affordable that monitoring and tracking of humans 
in real-time would be feasible.” The question that needs to be asked is why a strategy 
such as this should be instituted when it is such a small percentage of the world’s 
population that is causing breaches in security.  
 
For now the approach seems highly unlikely, but in the event of terrorist strikes 
increasing in frequency and magnitude to include such things as ‘limited’ nuclear strikes 
causing global unrest, it is possible that the approach could be adopted by governments 
beyond the military needs of network-centric warfare. We need only consider what 
happened during the worldwide SARS outbreak to comprehend the possibility of an ‘out-
of-control’ global epidemic. In similar scenarios, positioning technologies would help in 
a better understanding of the epidemiology of disease transmission as relationships 
between sufferers could be geographically represented. Kun (2004, p. 41) recently 
demonstrated the “need of sharing surveillance and epidemiological information 
worldwide and in real time”. Also shown was “the need for standards, geographical 
information systems (GISs), geo-coded information, and even the use of handheld 
devices to input data with imbedded spatial information from areas where the need for 
recording geographical coordinates is a must, (i.e., places where a dead animal/insect 
may be found for certain diseases).” His message resulted in the Italian project titled 
GeoSARS (Georeferenced Surveillance of Acute Respiratory Syndrome). The idea has 
been referred to as ‘syndrome surveillance’ and records patient symptoms and signs 
combined with an individual’s geographic location. McDonald (2002, p. 35) concurs with 
Kun on the issue of biosurveillance. He writes that, “[p]ublic health surveillance of 
population and environmental data can significantly improve detection of weapons of 




When describing responsive actions in homeland security, it is usually in terms of 
emergency management. According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA, 2003) emergency management is “the process of preparing for, mitigating, 
responding to and recovering from an emergency.” Contingency planning, which focuses 
on the “prevention of undesirable events and the mitigation of undesirable 
consequences,” comes before emergency preparedness (Wang, 2004, p. 22). 
Laxminarayan and Kun (2004, p. 27) prefer to separate the measures taken by first 
responders (local fire, police, ambulance and search and rescue departments) as active or 
passive. Active measures are “those measures that include denying entry of a person or 
substance or delivery system to the continent or states, our island territories, or access to 
sources of water, clean air, and crops, to large buildings, airports, and population-
gathering centers.” Passive measures on the other hand, “include rapid warning and 
evacuation, quarantining, mitigating through vaccines, health, fire, and police 
intervention.” Positioning technologies can address both of these types of measures. For 
instance, they could be used to send out different types of alerts. Dependent on the 
proximity of persons to target locations, various levels of alarms could be raised. A 
simple color-coded system could be devised such as the one cited by Wang (2004, p. 24) 
representing the different level of threat: “Green represents normal. Yellow means access 
controlled, under which security would increase patrols and ID would be checked at 
entrances. Red indicates restricted access by using one entrance to each building, with 
bags checked and visitors escorted. Black is the highest alert with campus closed.”  
 
Key infrastructure and other points of interest could be identified and marked in a GIS. 
These may include government offices, telecommunication hubs, landmarks, dams, 
utilities, refineries, transport hubs like airports, depots, stations and places where people 
congregate like hospitals, universities and schools, and shopping malls. Hotspots would 
have determinable vulnerability levels that could be updated dynamically. See maps 1-6 
for a hypothetical scenario of how GIS and other positioning technologies could be used 
for homeland defense in the future. In the event that an attack was launched, authorities 
would have the right to poll all active devices in the vicinity of the disaster. This would 
not only help local staff deal with a response effort to help the injured but also a 
containment effort to curb further disasters from occurring. The 9/11 attack could 
possibly have had fewer casualties if this kind of monitoring had taken place. Flight 11 
took off from Boston International at 8 a.m. and impacted the World Trade Centre at 8.45 
a.m., Flight 175 took off from the same location at 8.15 a.m. and impacted the World 
Trade Centre at 9.03 a.m., Flight 77 left Washington’s Dulles Airport 8.21 a.m. and 
impacted the Pentagon at 9.45 a.m., Flight 93 left Newark at 8.43 a.m. and crashed at 
10.10 a.m. The air traveling time of the shortest hi-jacking was 45 minutes. In future 
efforts, such events could be avoided by the use of positioning technologies. Containment 
could perhaps have been achieved on 9/11, even if terrorists had successfully impacted 
one of the Twin Towers.  
 
Apart from outdoor monitoring, indoor monitoring may also be applied. Context-aware 
building environments with surveillance beyond video cameras will become 
commonplace. Communication in these in-building settings could occur between “smart 
objects, between smart objects and background infrastructure services, and between smart 
objects and their users” (Siegemund & Flörkemeier, 2003, p. 379). Wireless LANs could 
be used to monitor UIDs. Anyone who should not be in the building would be detected. 
As the tags would be invisible to users, there would be an implicit association between 
their actions and the system. Whether the user agreed or not, an unobtrusive sensor could 
be triggered without their knowledge. This would be advantageous in the event of a 
breach in security but obviously unethical in any other circumstance.  
 
People involved in response efforts would be more educated about unfolding situations if 
positioning technologies were used. Improved access could be given to, for example, 
building layouts, floor plans and stairways, location of gas lines, water lines and air ducts. 
During the 9/11 recovery and response, firefighters were not given the adequate 
information they needed and as a result many lost their lives trying to put out a fire that 
was beyond control. The response was conducted in a state of panic, rather than being led 
by logical plans. People that were in the World Trade Centre had little knowledge of what 
was occurring outside. Route information for all of the emergency services would have 
helped with treating the injured and to establish basic hubs for communication. In 
addition, and in any responsive scenario, knowing where people are positioned during or 
immediately after a terrorist attack could help them receive aid quicker. Loved ones 
trying to locate missing persons would have instant information about whether or not 
their family and friends were victims. The UID could be triggered and linked back to 
vehicle registrations, addresses or other useful information. In events that were mainly 
chemical-based or biological, geographic information systems could be used to represent 
the area of concern after dispersion analysis or other required analyses had been 
determined. Civilians could be messaged about the effects of a biological attack, using 
their UID, either to an email or mobile handset through SMS (beyond that of media 
reports via broadcasts). Positioning technologies could also be used to precisely identify 
the location of debris to help with the reconstruction of what took place, and assist with 
clearing and rebuilding efforts. Cordoned off areas that were out-of-bounds for civilians 
could be identified on maps messaged to individuals affected by the disaster. In addition 
to this, information could be collected straight from field workers and sent via the 
appropriate applications to a secure government database, given the appropriate Web-
based portals for communication. Participants in a pilot for mobility and emergency 
services, post 9/11, were found to be “hopeful about the roles that mobile devices and 
wireless access can play in making their work life safer and also better enable them to 
perform their duties” (Sawyer et al., 2004, p. 64). The major advantage of wireless 
computing that the pilot reaffirmed was in the speed that information flowed from 
person-to-person, and from person-to-system using existing processes at critical times. It 
is also important to highlight that participants were more concerned with reliable 
connectivity than upload and download speeds. 
 
Taggart et al. (2003) have written extensively about the significance of satellite systems 
in emergency management. They describe that irrespective of how rapidly fixed and 
mobile operators get networks back in operation after a major disruption, that during 
terrorist attacks it is satellites that should be relied upon as an alternative system for 
communications. “The difficulty of many of the first responders… to communicate with 
themselves and to other federal agencies confirmed the need for an interoperable and 
flexible communication infrastructure… Since many of these agencies must make time-
critical decisions, there may not be enough time for communication links to be restored 
using conventional mobile ground or airborne nodes” (Taggart et al., 2003, p. 1155). In 
the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, it was privately-owned satellites that provided 
communications when landline and terrestrial networks failed. Some examples include 
the Iridium and Globalstar providers. Quite possibly first responders in the future will be 
equipped with GPS universal phones to allow for coordination, management and 
integration in the response effort. While Taggart et al. predict that only the key personnel 
will most likely be equipped with GPS phones due to the fact that first responders are 
already heavily equipped with other tools, the devices will likely be wearable (especially 
as the GPS chipsets get smaller). In addition to person-to-person communications and 
person-to-system communications, system-to-system communications could also take 
place. In the event of a radioactive, chemical or biologically exposed area, sensor data 
could automatically be collected and sent to laboratories for more detailed analysis. 
According to Want (2004, p. 86), detectors could minimize the danger of “long-term 
exposure to such harmful agents, many of which are invisible and odorless. In addition, 
deploying such devices at national ports of entry could help identify potential terrorist 
activity before it occurs.” Saydjari (2004, p. 56) is correct in his summation that “[w]e 
need a spectrum of system models and an engineering framework analogous to the 
CAD/CAM framework used by hardware engineers. The community needs adequate 
threat models, adversary models, mission models, and countermeasure effectiveness 
models. Each type of model will require tremendous energy to produce, yet little effort is 
under way in these arenas.” Assuming these models are created and implemented, their 
success will lie in the ubiquitous adoption of positioning technologies in open and closed 
environments, by all people, things and infrastructure whether in the form of GPS, 2G/3G 
mobile, RFID, or other communication-based means. Success may also, at least in some 
respects, depend on the implementation of a priority system, whereby mobile technology 
infrastructure allows government and emergency personnel communications access 
before civilians and businesses. 
 
SOCIAL CONTEXT 
Where positioning technologies play a significant role in homeland security environments 
and their monitoring, a social context needs to be created in which defense strategies are 
appropriate and security requirements are accordingly aligned. Current ventures have 
been fuelled by demand for increasing standards of protection, and have been propelled 
in advancement by events such as 9/11 in the U.S. and, in the Asia-Pacific region, by the 
Bali Bombing in 2002. In addition to this, the dual-use aspect of the technologies, where 
public and private implementations exist side-by-side, has led to interest and funding 
from commercial sectors. While the integration of positioning technologies in areas of 
defense remains a high priority, worldwide civil applications continue to develop, each 
one more innovative than the last. This commercial influence and the private use of 
defense technology (though arguably not the private use of defense systems themselves) 
are pushing advancement in directions that are totally incomparable to historical military 
and homeland security developments. Indeed, in the current information age, we are 
seeing an unprecedented development and dispersion of technology. This new investment 
however, despite its potential for success, is not necessarily the way to curb all future 
security breaches. Warranted as the effort may be, especially in terms of pure peace-
keeping efforts, arguing that this set of advancements are better or more advantageous 
than previous developments simply because they are ‘different’ or more widely accepted 
is erroneous. The odds of total success are still low and are marred by the fact that no 
system can ever be foolproof. 
 
Faults in hardware and inaccuracies in software aside, positioning technology cannot 
exist in a vacuum. Most systems require a user, or, at the very least, some form of user 
input and it is here, in the realm of ‘intelligence’ that most problems lie. Indeed, we can 
build the technology but we often have problems utilizing it appropriately and 
effectively. The knowledge systems that are required to provide the scope for positioning 
technologies are often flawed. Take for example the 1999 bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy in Belgrade by United States military forces. On May 7th, at around midnight 
local time in Serbia, one of a fleet of American B-2 bombers dropped five Joint Direct 
Attack Munitions 2000-pound bombs on a target in Belgrade. The target had previously, 
and wrongly, been identified as the head office for the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for 
Supply and Procurement (FDSP). Instead, what actually stood in the target location was 
the Chinese Embassy. The bombs, all GPS-guided missiles set to operate “in all weather 
and at night using a satellite-based navigation system of a high order of accuracy”, 
(United States Department of Defense, 1999) reached their geographic target 
successfully, killing three Chinese journalists and injuring twenty embassy staff. In later 
press releases and formal statements of apology, the U.S. government admitted that the 
bombing was both an error and an accident. The positioning technology had functioned 
correctly but the knowledge systems supporting it had failed. Official accounts pointed to 
three major intelligence faults. First, the technique used to locate the FDSP building was 
imprecise. The geographic co-ordinates of the building were produced using inexact land 
navigation techniques to pinpoint a street address on out-of-date maps. Second, the 
databases used to correlate and cross correlate the location of the target and its 
surroundings housed incomplete and dirty data. With regard to the Chinese Embassy in 
particular, multiple databases within the U.S. Department of Defense showed it still to be 
in its pre-1996 location, even despite several visits to the new building by U.S. officials 
after 1996. Accordingly, the Embassy was never identified as being in the target location, 
and the FDSP building was never shown to be anywhere else. The third major 
intelligence flaw involved the focus of the attack. Pre-attack reviews had centered upon 
how to attack, the value of the target, and the possibility of collateral damage. The 
accuracy of the location was never questioned. The culmination of these events was that 
the bombing went ahead in error. U.S. officials had become complacent with the use of 
knowledge management systems and this was reflected in the way the positioning 
technology was applied. 
 
Before we can really use the technology in its most beneficial capacity, we need to master 
the art of information intelligence. If the use of positioning technology is to be accepted, 
it needs to be employed using legitimate inputs. Indeed, though its use may be valid for 
homeland security purposes, it is not valid to use the technology improperly or to cause 
damage outside the immediate need for action, whether or not this action is protective. To 
create a positive process for use, a change in the culture surrounding information 
gathering and knowledge systems may be required. Indeed, when considering the issue of 
timeliness needed for knowledge gathering in the Information Age, Kun (2004, p. 35) 
writes, “[w]e need to change our methods, our systems, our infrastructures, our 
procedures, and our policies.” Where this change is not incited, the impact and 
acceptance of positioning technology may be lessened. That there are gray areas and 
potentially unacceptable uses for it though does not convincingly indicate that we are 
concentrating on the wrong initiative. To ensure maximum benefit however, technology 
cannot be the only initiative on which progress in homeland security depends. The 
potential for human error in the operation of positioning technologies and the 
management of their associated knowledge systems means that the creation of checks, 
balances and support systems must become a vital part of the defense infrastructure. Not 
only this, but alternate and distinct initiatives in areas such as peacekeeping and 
economic controls (to name but two global areas for concern) must also share a critical 
focus. By creating this multi-faceted defense system then, some level of dynamism in 
security strategy is assured as varying options for action and reaction are available. This 
becomes paramount as, faced with nebulous enemies, “static preventative techniques, 
while important, are inadequate” (Saydjari, 2004, p. 54). 
 
FUTURE TRENDS 
The use of positioning technology as a means of automatic and location-based 
identification is set to increase exponentially. In line with the size of increase however, 
the rate of increase will depend greatly upon general agreements as to application quality 
and standards. For positioning technologies, especially those in dual public and private 
use, an assessment of application quality is often dependent upon commercial or 
application readiness. As such, applications being researched present different concerns 
to those products being sold in the marketplace. Further, technologies that utilise humans 
as major elements (not simply as participants) in the overall system create additional 
issues. Take for example the Cyborg 1.0 experimentation conducted by British university 
Professor Kevin Warwick regarding human implantation with RFID transponders. 
Though Warwick’s implant created an unparalleled interactive environment within the 
confines of his laboratory, he was only able to keep the implant inside his arm for nine 
days in the first experiment. A direct blow to the transponder would likely have shattered 
the casing, doing irreparable damage to the surrounding nerves and tissue. Similarly, 
research in the area of location based services faces technological hurdles as combining 
GPS with humancentric RFID involves challenges of radiation shielding, miniaturization 
and power supply.  
 
The first stage of evolution is therefore likely to be contained to the extended definition 
and tagging of inanimate and non-human objects. This will promote the creation of 
industry standards and allow appropriate advancement in quality to gain a foothold before 
we are faced with real debate over humancentric applications. In military circles, mass 
asset tagging has already begun. Both Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq for example, used RFID tracking to identify and manage 
various cargo shipments. By January 2005, under mandate from the U.S. Department of 
Defense, all suppliers to the military will be required to use passive RFID tagging on 
shipments of goods. This condition exists at all packaging levels, with separate stringent 
requirements for the tagging of high-value assets. There are few exemptions. These 
efforts mirror progress in the private sector with recent moves by U.S. giant Wal-Mart to 
require that their top 100 suppliers implement systems for the RFID tagging of goods by 
2005. Similarly, numerous manufacturers including Benetton and Gillette have already 
conducted RFID packaging trials, showing a move into the mainstream for this 
application of the technology. 
 
If we take the commercialization of defense innovations such as GPS and the Internet as 
an evolutionary indicator, the dual use of technology will gain greater momentum. Where 
governments have previously opened up research to allow the private sector an 
autonomous strand of development, we are now seeing a re-convergence of application 
paths to create superior knowledge systems. Where defense-type positioning technologies 
were once a reserved realm of implementation, they are now on the brink of embracing a 
wider economic and managerial scope. To illustrate, prior to 1994 the Defense 
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) run by the Department of Defense, and the 
Polar-orbiting Operational Environment Satellite Program controlled by the Department 
of Commerce existed as separate entities. In the early 1990s however, the potential cost 
efficiencies and performance improvements that the combination of the two systems 
might bring was identified. In May 1994, a convergence plan was submitted to the U.S. 
Congress and, four years later, was endorsed by the President. The result, in 1998, was 
the National Polar Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), a polar-
orbiting environmental satellite system that capitalized on NASA’s Earth Observing 
System to satisfy both civil and military requirements. Since that time it has successfully 
managed the command and control functions of both programs, and has arguably done so 
at a reduced cost. Convergence in terms of homeland security does have some 
disadvantages however. By integrating multiple systems into a singular entity it 
compounds the number of operational facets that are susceptible to a breach in security. 
Further, where lines of demarcation are not clearly drawn between each system 
component, questions as to the involvement of non-defense agencies in homeland 
security may be raised. These considerations mean that the future effects of using 
homeland security systems for defense, or of them being targeted in a security breach, are 
amplified in comparison to current states. The use of hybrid knowledge systems widens 
the scope for social damage. The willingness to converge systems to gain economic and 
technological economies of scale must be tempered by a visible delineation of ownership 
and responsibility, and must be managed by appropriate implementation and recovery 
strategies if the future visions for convergence and heightened knowledge systems are to 
be successful ones. Nonetheless, it is questionable whether changes to current 
arrangements will actually take place, especially in the short term. 
 
In supporting convergence and enhanced knowledge systems, we face a battle with 
bureaucracy as information sharing channels are still not currently suited to the free flow 
of information between government and law enforcement agencies. In the area of 
homeland security specifically, information sharing channels were dealt a serious blow 
after Watergate when new reforms prohibited the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
from distributing the findings of criminal investigations to any other national security 
agency, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Though arguably implemented 
with good intention, the serious flaw in this development became obvious when several 
major terrorist attacks were staged in the U.S. during the early 1990s. The 1993 bombing 
of the World Trade Centre is a pertinent example. Six days after the bombing, the FBI 
detained 26-year old Palestinian Mohammed Salameh for attempting to claim his rental 
car deposit on the van that had housed the bomb. Under the Watergate reforms though, 
post-arrest and so long as additional fugitives remained, the FBI could only concentrate 
on the prosecution of those captured and could not aid the investigations of any other 
agency. While progress in information sharing has been made since this time, many 
anomalies remain. To illustrate, though the U.S. Homeland Security Act of 2002 contains 
provisions that, “[e]xcept as otherwise directed by the President, the Secretary [of 
Homeland Security] shall have such access as the Secretary considers necessary to all 
information, including reports, assessments, analyses, and unevaluated intelligence 
relating to threats of terrorism against the United States…” senior government officials 
from within the Department of Homeland Security have confirmed that there are 
difficulties in extracting threat-related information from government agencies. This is in 
addition to a formal statement made by Jerry Berman, President of the Center for 
Democracy and Technology, during testimony before the Homeland Security Committee 
Subcommittee of Intelligence and Counterterrorism on March 25
th
 2004. Here he 
confirmed, “the sharing of terrorist-related information between relevant agencies at 
different levels of government has only been marginally improved in the last year, and 
remains haphazard. It is still comprised of multiple systems that cannot communicate 
with each other... It is not the result of a carefully considered network architecture that 
optimizes the abilities of all of the players.” 
 
Further leaning toward a lack of successful convergence in the short-term, bureaucratic 
and legal systems are not suited to the rapid response needed in defense scenarios. The 
wheels of justice turn slowly and the problem with treating a matter as purely a law 
enforcement issue means that it also becomes understood in this context. A division 
between what is legislated for and what can be achieved then becomes the practical 
reality. In terms of terrorism and homeland security, it is further detrimental as issues of 
intelligence, state sponsorship and individual freedoms can become secondary. The 
ramifications of this are not always obvious, especially when legislation is enacted as a 
reflexive and defensive measure. At the time of a breach in homeland security, the 
immediate benefits of the legislation in providing a solution or a means of retribution are 
those that are given attention. In time however, the more wide-ranging effects are seen. 
One of the most contemporary examples has been the enactment of the USA Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 
2001. Passed by Congress a mere 45 days after the 9/11 attacks in New York City, its 
progress through the parliament saw very limited debate. In a 342 page-long document, 
the legislation made sweeping changes to 15 other statutes plus enacted new provisions 
of its own. In this regard, the Act took vital steps toward providing for the victims of 9/11 
and toward increasing and improving forensic capabilities toward cyber-crime.  
 
Three years on however, investigations show that the long-term repercussions of the 
PATRIOT Act were, perhaps, not adequately considered and that the Act may indeed 
violate individual rights of citizens. The grim reality is that in order to improve homeland 
security, new powers were given to law enforcement and intelligence agencies, both 
domestic and international, at the cost of eliminating the controls that previously existed 
to ensure that courts had authority to regulate the abuse of such powers. With the 
safeguards removed, various government agencies are now able to conduct covert 
searches without warrants, including wide-ranging telephone and Internet surveillance, 
and can access all financial, medical, mental health and student records which were 
previously unavailable to them. Investigation of American citizens may now occur where 
no probable cause of crime exists and non-citizens may be jailed or denied re-admission 
to the U.S. based upon mere suspicion of criminal intent (American Civil Liberties 
Union, n.d.). This shows a conundrum in assessing the true value behind many homeland 
security strategies. The turbulent social context in which the initial assessment of damage 
is made can lead to skewed notions of what is appropriate in response. Then, as Davies 
(2002, p. 37) states, “[h]ow do we distinguish genuine and meaningful public security 
proposals from those based on convenience and illusion, and yet avoid the appearance of 
ingratitude or cynicism toward those who might just be doing their best to help?” 
 
It is impossible to tell whether the current lack of comprehension and unity in response to 
homeland security initiatives is a sign of things getting worse before they get better, or 
whether it simply shows that each new terrorist action will place greater restraints on 
freedom. What can be predicted with certainty is that the positioning technologies used to 
support defense and associated bureaucratic efforts will continue to advance. How they 
are implemented will be a product of the efficiencies that we are seeking to create at 
present. Thus, the structures that we are only now starting to build will reflect in the use 
of positioning technologies and their underlying knowledge systems. An absence of long-
term studies makes the evolutionary path difficult to predict in this respect and can only 
be further complicated by any attempt to prejudge the ethics that will inevitably become a 
part of all future security actions. The result is that though we can predict an application 
of technology, we cannot predict its effect or outcome.  
 
CONCLUSION 
There is no simple or singular solution to the current security crisis and with the 
increasing complexities of global advancement caution must be taken when formulating a 
response. Both cause and effect of action must be assessed. Here, let us compare two very 
different but equally devastating events. On the 26
th
 of April 1986, a nuclear accident and 
fire damaged a power plant in Chernobyl. For days afterwards, a giant cloud of radiation 
hovered over much of Europe and today the consequences are still being felt through 
infertile land and human deformity. In citing an article by Reuters, Kun (2004, p. 42) 
writes that it took until 1990 for the Soviet authorities to realize the extent of the 
accident. After evacuating 100,000 people within a 20 mile zone a few days after the 
disaster, authorities evacuated another 14,000 at the end of 1990, for a sum total of 
90,000 people in the years after the actual event had occurred. Though the damage was 
catastrophic and widespread, the global response was limited. Initiatives to make nuclear 
power and associated facilities safer received little attention and those who were not 
directly affected by the accident were able to ignore its occurrence without ramifications. 
In contrast, on September 11, 2001, two passenger jets flew into the Twin Towers in New 
York City. Though killing thousands, the geographic damage was confined to Manhattan. 
Emotionally however, the whole world was affected. Governments leapt into action and a 
new Age of Terror was declared. Why then, in two such catastrophic disasters, did the 
response differ so widely? Arguably, the vital difference between the two situations, and 
the factor that caused such different reactions, was the element of intention. Where the 
disaster at Chernobyl was not the result of hostility, 9/11 was a political statement 
designed to invoke fear. As a result, the global response was rapid. Keeping in mind that 
terrorist attacks were not new to the world however, why was the response as large and as 
quick as it was? A new age perhaps, beyond that of the Information Age? Or did the new 
scale and magnitude of such nebulous hostility make us angry? And was our response 
tailored in a similarly heated fashion?  
 
Leaving these questions unanswered, what we gain from the comparison is an 
understanding that where hostile elements are the force behind a disaster, governments 
are not immune to responding on similarly emotive grounds. This is often justified by an 
overriding want to protect its citizens. With no higher level of review than government 
itself however, this ability to be affected by emotion means that when taking action, 
appropriate safeguards must exist. This is especially true in the case of positioning (and 
other) technologies, as the effects of implementing technology are often greater than the 
technology itself. What we must ask therefore, in relation to the outcomes of the response 
and the further implementation of homeland security measures is whether a proactive 
approach to defense incites more hostile behavior? Does the use of new technology as a 
defensive measure provoke enemies by laying down a challenge? Imagine for example, if 
George W. Bush succeeded in his implementation of the Star Wars missile defense plan 
for the United States. Would this success reflect a “ready for anything” attitude? Would 
its very existence encourage attack? As McDonald (2002, p. 37) states, “[o]ur greatest 
paradox is that- if a massive security build-up in the United States is perceived as 
insensitive and predatory- our defensive actions incite the type of attacks that we are 
trying to defend against.” And what to say if the satellite and monitoring systems were, 
like the advancement paths for the technology itself, to take on dual roles in both the 
public defense and the private commercial sectors? This immediately widens the effect of 
impact should the system be a target for, or the source of, an attack. Immense care must 
therefore be taken with the adoption of positioning technologies, especially since recent 
advancements in GPS, mobile telephony, RFID and GIS have made them a viable option 
for defensive implementations. As implementers, governments also need to provide 
support for the knowledge systems which underpin the technology. Without a strong 
information base from which to derive useful inputs, the positioning technology is 
rendered useless or, in a worst-case scenario, can create situations far more damaging 
than those ever imagined. This is because though it is easy to speculate over the path of 
advancement, the outcomes of adoption are never as simple to predict. 
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